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REVISTA. STIINTIFICA 
an.2, nr. 3-4, (decembrie) 12008 
~i }1i , i =1, ... , 3, precum ~i valoarea coeficientului de trafic Pi pentru fiecare flux, 
sunt prezentate In urmatorul tabel. 
Ex. L} L2 LJ fJ 
a) A}=1,20 !W3,90 p}=0,31 A2=0,30 /12=2,70 Ip2=0,11 A3=2,40 1/1;=4,00 PJ=0,60 0,82 
b) A}=1,20 /1}=2,30 Ip}=0,52 A2=0,30 1/12=0,70 P2=0,43 A3=2,40 '/13=2,70 prO,89 1,25 
c) A}=IO,OO jJ}=1,30 Ip}=7,69 A;=3,00 I~=O,IO p;=30,00 A3=4,00 ,Ll,3=1.00 pr4,00 8,26 
In exemplul a) coeficientii de trafic pentru fiecare flux sunt mai mici ca I ~i P 
pentru tot sistemul care este mai mic ca I - indica ca nu se formeaza ~iruri de 
a~teptare de lungimi mario Exemplul b) prezinta interes deoarece, de§i coeficientul 
de trafic pentru fiecare flux este mai mic ca I, tot~i P =1,25> 1, ceea ce indica ca 
In sistem se formeaza ~iruri de a~teptare nelimitate. Exemplul c) indica 0 
supralncarcare a sistemului. 
Prezinta interes sistemele cu mai multe fluxuri de intrare ~i 0 singura statie In 
care statia de servire necesita un "timp de orientare" pentru a putea trece de la 
servirea unei cereri de un anumit tip la servirea unitatilorde alt tip. Exista· 
numeroase aplicatii a acestui tip de sistem de ~teptare In economie, medicina ~i In 
telmologiile reteLelor Quality of Service (QoS) ~i Class of Service (CoS). 
In urmatorul des en este ilustrata orientarea statiei de la cererile din fluxul Lj La 
cererile din fluxul L3 «are au 0 prioritate mai inalta. 
LJ 0 0 0 

Ll 0 n n 

L, 0 0 Q 
Li 0 0 00 
L) 0 0000 
L. 00 0 0 
Pentru acest tip de sisteme indicatorul de rncarcare a sistemului se 
determina cu ajutorul metodelor numerice, deoarece In formula de calcul a acestei 
expresii se contine 0 marime care nu poate fi determinata analitic. Au fost elaborati 
algoritmi numerici care permit calculul ma:rimilor necesare (vezi (6, 7] ). 
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CHlI,ll;HKAThI KOHTPAEAH,.l1,hI JIIO.l(bMll- OJIllTOIIOJIbHhIM 

AHAJUI3 B KOHTEKCTE CE,l(EPKOrnmrCKOrO IIPOQECCA 

PEOPLE SMUGGLING SYNDICATES - AN OLIGOPOLY ANALYSIS 

IN CONTEXT OF THE SODERKOPING PROCESS 

Teo JIYHJ(FPEH, drd. USM 
Abstract. B cmambe, pQ3euma MoOe.nb OJluzonOJluu (oyonMuu) cUIiOUKamOIJ KOllmpa6allObl 
J/lOObMU. 51 pacCMampusQ/o C/ly'lQU Cournot U Stacke/berg. CHa4Ma pacCMampueaemcJl 
oemepMullucmu4ecKUu nooxoo 11 KomopOM Jl YKQ3bll1alO yC/106UJl, npu KOmopblJ:: Oea cUI10UKama 
MaKCUA/U3upoeanu 6bl ux npu6blllb, U KaKDebl 6yoym PblH0411ble pesyJlbmambl. 3ame.M, MOOe.nb co 
cmoxacmU4ecKUMU pacnpeoe.nellUJlMu eeoOumCJl, .Il Komopoo '1UCf1fi Muzpallmoe Ji8llJllOmCJl 
cny4aUllblMU. YKQ3aHO, 4mo oemepMuHucmu4ecKUu nooxoo - I1cezo JlUU/b Cl1elfUMbliblU clry4au 
cmoxaCmU'IeCK020, K020a pacnpeoe.neHue CKolilfeHmpup06QHO 11 001100 m04Ke. 
Introd uction 
According to the ICMPD, more than 122.000 migration related border 
apprehensions were recorded in 2006 at the borders of those 18 Central and . 
Eastern European countries and territories that were able to provide such an 
indicator. This represents a drop by 9% incomparison with the previous year [4:7]. 
There is a Clear trend, according to which the number of recorded border 
. apprehensions rose sharply for the region during the 90-ies, reached a peak in the 
year 2000, and has since then been dropping (4: 16]. The number one country of 
origin of apprehended people was Ukraine, followed by Moldova [4:9]. 
One possible explanation for the falling number of apprehensions is that 
people smuggling today tends to be run by highly organised networks, or 
syndicates, operating on an international and very professional basis . This has been 
pointed out by a vast number of authors (I, 4, 5, 6, I I]. People smuggling h~s 
become an intermediary part of the global migration business (10]. : 
In the followingarticle I first present some stylised facts on illegal migration arid 

people smuggling in two of the Soderkoping process countries: Belarus and Ukraine. I 

then develop an oligopoly (duopoly) model ofa general case, widely applicable to these 

countries, to show the conditions under which two people smuggling syndicates would 

maximise their profits, and what the market outcomes would be. 

Stylised facts 
In illegal migration, a similar pattern seems to appear for Belarus, Ukraine 

and Moldova: Foreign nationals and stateless persons enter these countries legally. 

They then change their status to illegal and try to enter the EU, often with the help 

ofpeople smugglers [9:24]. 

In Belarus, during the first 10 months of 2003, the Ministry of Interior 
discovered 127 crimes related to illegal transporting of people across the state 
border. The activities of 14 criminal groups operating in the business were 
suppressed [2:83]. Recently, among those trying to cross the border illegally in order 
to reach the EU, there has been an increase in the number of apprehensions of CIS 
citizens, especially from Moldova, Central Asia, Ukraine and Russia [2:96]. At the 
same time, the general number of border apprehensions has gone down [2:23]. 
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In the period 1999-200 I, more than 300 organised groups of migrants trying 
to get to Poland or the Baltic states were apprehended in Belarus. Over 200 
channels for people smuggling were neutralized [8:19]. 
In 2004, 24 organised crime groups, specialising in people smuggling, were 
discovered by Belarusian authorities [8:25]. 
For Ukraine, the number of illegal immigrants has been growing in recent 
years. The total number of illegal migrants detained by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and the State Border Service units was 25,539 in 2004 and 32,726 in 2005 
[12:10]. 10M esti~ates that only 5 to 10% of all migrants illegally transiting 
through Ukrainian territory' are detained by the Ukrainian government [ibid]. 
Whereas in 2003 most of the illegal migrants were Africans and Southeast Asians, 
today 70% come from other CIS countries [12: I 0-11]. 
In comparison with other countries in the region, the number of 
apprehensions taking place at the green border is very high for Ukraine. In 2004­
2005, most illegal migrants avoided official ched..-points. In addition, 99% of 
apprehended migrants are smuggled by transnational organised crime groups [7:2]. 
There is a strong presence of networks backed up by funding and equipment from 
trans-border crime groups [9:8]. 
In the period 0[2004-2006, 334 criminal organisations acting as channels of 
illegal migration were detected by Ukrainian authorities. The number of criminal 
organisations that were eliminated during the same time period was 240 [4:239]. 
People smuggling syndicates: Analytical model 
There is evidence that syndicates are today the most common form through 
which the smuggling of migrantstake~ pJace [6:6-7]. Consequently, many authors 
have outlined how they work. Syndicates are, for example, very skilled at adapting 
their modus operandi [4,10]. One explanation for ,the efficiency of people smugg­
ling syndicates is their organisational structure. People smuggling syndicates are 
simply horizontal networks operating on an international basis [1, 6, 13]. Typi­
cally, these networks are star-shaped, i.e. there is a masterminding organiser in the 
centre who delegates functions to many different "arms". These arms, however, are 
independent and do not know about each other [6:7]. For a comprehensive 
overview of the division oflabour in a people smuggling network, see [II]. 
Overall, there is reason to believe that these syndicates to a great extent 
resemble oligopolies [II]. For example, they tend to use product differentiatio n 
and charge different prices. However, when analyzing them, due to a lack of 
empirical data, it is difficult to say with certainty whether one duopoly model or 
another should be preferred. In the following model, I therefore consider both the 
Coumot and the Stackelberg case. 
1 Deterministic approach 
For the first people smuggling syndicate we have the following profit function: 
II, =[a- b(q, + q2)]q, + ~ - a2q~ -a,q, -ao 
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where al > 0, i = 1,2,3 . ~ is a random income variable that has been included in 
the function in order to reflect the fact that syndicates often, on a parallel basis, 
smuggle other commodities as well, such as narcotics [11: 15]. We assume that the 
risk, i.e. the cost for the syndicate, increases jointly with ql' In other words: The 
more migrants there are to be smuggled, the higher would be the risk (cost). 
Consequently, the cost function is quadratic and looks as shown in fig. I : 
So 
q, 
Fig. 1 
The profit for syndicate I is to be maximized by choice of q, . 
The first order condition for a maximum is 
aD, = [a _ b(q, + q2)] -bq, - b aq2 q, - 2a2 q,":' a, = 0 	 (I) 
aq, 	 aq, 
The Coumot analysis of duopoly is based on the assumption that the conjectural 
variation 	aq2 is zero. The Cournot equilibrium is then defined to be that pair of 
aq, 
(qpq2) which is obtained under assumption of zero conjectural variation. 
From the first condition we have 
[a- b(q, +q2)]-bq,-2a2q,-a, =0. 
Solving this equation we obtain 
a-a, 	 a-a 
q, By symmetry q2 =---' 
3b +2a2 
The equilibrium market price is 
ab +2aa + 2ba. . 2(a - a ) p = 2 , , and mdustry output IS qi = ' 
3b + 2a 	 3b + 2a2 
The dynamics ofthe .Cournot approach can be analysed by using reaction curves, 
showing the optimal output for each syndicate, given the output of the competitor. 
From the above equation for the Coumot equilibrium, assuming a one period lag, 
the reaction curves are 
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__ 
ql(t+1)= (a-~ -bq2(t)) (2)
2b+ 2a2 
q2(t+1)= (a-a,-bq,(t)) (3)
2b + 2a2 
The reaction curves are shown in Fig.2. 

Let us now consider the Stackelberg analysis of duopoly. Suppose that syndicate 1 

believes that syndicate 2 would react along the Coumot reaction curve: 

. (a-a :"'bq )q = I I 
2 2b+ 2a .2 
The conjectural variation is then 
oq2
-= 
b 
aq, 2b+2a2 ' 
so using (1) 
oI1 b2 
I =[a~b(q, +q2)]-bql + ql-2a2ql-aj =0, 
oql 2b+2a2 
and the reaction curve for syndicate 1 is 
a-al -bq2 
ql = b2 
2b+2a2---­2b + 2a2 
The outcome for both syndicates depends on .the behavior of syndicate 2. If 
syndicate 2 is using the Coumot reaction curve, as syndicate I believes, then the 
solution is the Stackelberg equilibrium for syndicate I: 
2 (2b+2a2?-b b](a-a)
[ 2b + 2a2 I 
If we suppose that syndicate 2 is not using the Coumot reaction curve but is also 
using the Stackelberg reaction curve, so that each syndicate incorrectly believes 
that the other is using the naIve Cournot assumption, then the result is the 
Stackelberg disequilibrium 
(a - ~ )(2b + 2a2 ) 
ql = q2 = (2b + 2a2 )2 - b2 + b(2b + 2a2 ) 
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a-a, 
b 
~ 
2b+2a, 
2(a-a,) 
3b+2a, 
2(a-a,) ~ ~ 
3b+2a, 2b+2a, b 
Fig. 2 
2. Random number of migrants. 
In this section we assume that the numbers of migrants, i.e. the clients of the 
syndicates, are random variables with some probability distributions that have a 
known type. Let q;, i = 1,2, be a random number of migrants that will choose for 
their border crossing syndicatei. We suppose that ql' i = 1,2, has the probability 

distribution p(x, 8,), wh~re e; = (e/ ,8/ ,...,en is a vector ofunknown parameters. Let 

E[q;] = m;(8) , (4) 

Var[ q; ] = D(8), (5) 

denote the expectation and the variance of the random variable q" i = 1,2. The 
syndicate i tends to maximise the expected profit 
E[I1;] = E[(a-b(q, +q2))q, -:a2q;2 -alq; -ao] (6) 
We can believe that the competition between the syndicates establishes such values 
of the distribution parameters that the expected profits of both syndicates will be 
maximised. We would like to stress that the equilibrium in this case is the 
distribution. The previous deterministic approach is a special case of the stochastic 
one, when the distribution is concentrated in one point. Using (4-6) we can obtaiin 
the expected profit for the first syndicate I 
E[I1I] =ami (81) - bE[D(81) + m I2(81)] - bm, (81)m2(82)­
2 
-a2 [D(81) + mI (81)] - alml(81) - ao 
The fust order condition for the first syndicate has the form 
a oml _b oD; _b~ _ oD; - a om: - a o~ =0, i =1,2, .. . , m.Q
2 2 J (7)aei oe, oel .. oel oei oe1' 
Solving (7) for e; we obtain the optimal solution. 
37 
Example 1. Let qj, i =1,2 have Poisson distributions with the parameters Aj 
Ak 

P(q,=k)= k!exp(-A), k=0,1,2, .... 

Then 
E[nl] = a)., -b()., +).,2)_b).,\ -i1z()" +).,2)_al)., -ao' 
In this case the conditions (7) take the fonn: 
8E[n l ] 	 8\• 
--= a- 2bI~ -b-b --bI~ ~~ -a -a1 =0. ~ I~~ -2a 1 	 (8)2
' ' ' 
Under the assumption aA2 =° , by symmetry, the analogue of the Coumot 
a)., 
equilibrium is 
)., =\ =a-b-a2-aj • 
3b +2a2 
In comparison with the deterministic case, we can see the additional term in the 
numerator, -b - a2 , and the p~ofit of the syndicates is lower. 
"Average" reaction curves can be found from (8) 
).,(t+l) a-b-a2-al -bA2(t), 
. 2b + 2a2 
\(t + I) = a - b - a2 - a l - b)., (t) . 
2b + 2a2 
They are shown in Fig.3 
112 
a-a, -b -° 1 
b 
a-a, -02, -b 
2b +202 
a-6-02 -0, 
36 +2a2 
>- • 111 
a-a, -b-ao-b-o], -~ a-a, -02 -b 1 
3b +202 2h+2a1 b 
Fig. 3 
Example 2. Let q" i =I, 2 have binomial distributions with parameters ni and p : 
P(q,=k)=C:'pk(1_p )",-k, k=0,1,2,oo., ni • 
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This assumption could be explained in the following way. There are nl + n2 
migrants in the border area. Every migrant from the first uses syndicate I with nl 

the probability p independently of others, and every migrant from the second 
 n2 
uses syndicate 2 with the probability p, also independently of others. Then qj is 
the number of migrants using syndicate i, and obviously these numbers have 
binomial distributions. In this case the expected profit for the first syndicate is 
E[nj] =anjp - b(~p(1- p) + (nIP)2) - bn1pn2 P - a2(~p(1- p) + 
+(njp)2) - al~p - ao' 
The first order condition is 
8E[n j ] 	 2 2 8n22 
----;::::- = ap - bp(1- p) - 2bn l P - bp n2 - bnlP -;:-­
u~ ~ (9) 
-a2P(1- p) - 2a2nlP2 - alP = ° 
Then if an2 =°we have, by symmetry 
ani 
ap - bp(1- p) - a p(1- p) - a p a - b(1- p) - a (1- p) - a ln=n= 2 1= 2 

I 2 3bp2 + 2a2p2 3bp + 2a2P 

"Average" reaction curves can be found from (9) 
n (t + I) = ap - bp(1- p) - a2P(1- p) - alP - bp2n2(t) 
I 	 2 2 ' 2bp +2a2P 
ap - bp(1- p) - a p(1- p) - a p - bp2n (t) 
112 (t +	I) = 2 1 I. 
. 2bp2 + 2a2p 2 
We find that under the condition P = I we have a deterministic case. 
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